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on the intricacies and evolution of
former Soviet, East German, and Cu-
ban interpretations of and influence on
the politics of the Horn of Africa be-
tween 1977-1978. The word begin is
emphasized because, at the same time,
these documents are far from compre-
hensive in that a number of very criti-
cal events and developments during this
period find scant or no mention. Some
of these issues will be mentioned in this
commentary. Nevertheless, reviewing
these documents, it will be difficult in-
deed to underplay the crucial signifi-
cance of the East-West standoff which
served as the context in which the
former USSR and its allies compre-
hended and attempted to shape the poli-
tics of the region. Ultimately, this prism
led to the gradual choice of cultivating
close ties and rendering decisive sup-
port to the military government in
Ethiopia beginning in 1976. In turn, this
choice molded that regime and guaran-
teed its survival until 1991 when only
the end of the Cold War and diminished
Soviet support coupled with the Eritrean
and Tigrean liberation front victories led
to its collapse.
The publication of these documents
should therefore serve as a valuable
stimulus for international scholarship on
superpower involvement in Africa dur-
ing the Cold War and also arouse schol-
ars on Ethiopia in particular to reexam-
ine and enrich conventional wisdom
about the political history of the
Mengistu era. Furthermore, the fact that
the country now has a completely dif-
ferent leadership which is not tainted
with the atrocities of Mengistu and the
Derg means, at least theoretically, that
it will have nothing to lose by collabo-
rating in international research efforts
and releasing pertinent documents from
Ethiopian archives (unlike Angola for
example). On the contrary, such a col-
laboration would not only enable the
allies apparently hoped to anchor them-
new Ethiopia to take deserved credit
selves firmly on the Horn in an attempt
from the international scholarly com-
to position themselves to play impor-
munity, but also to reap the intellectual
tant political and/or military roles in the
reward of a better understanding of a
whole volatile region.
regime that it fought so gallantly and
Nevertheless, at the beginning of
with immense sacrifice to topple.
the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974, Mos-
My specific comments on these
cow was slow to react to the overthrow
documents will focus on three major
of imperial rule and the military take-
themes—Soviet influence on: (a) the
over in Addis Ababa led by the Provi-
military regime; (b) the Ethio-Somali
sional Military Administrative Council
war and; (c) the Eritrean secessionist
(PMAC) or Derg. This hesitancy might
movement.
be explained by a legitimate Soviet re-
luctance to antagonize Somalia, espe-
I. Soviet relations with the PMAC
cially in light of recent setbacks the
Sudan and Egypt, where Moscow had
Soviet interest in winning a posi-
lost influence in spite of massive eco-
tion of strength on the Horn of Africa
nomic and military aid to these coun-
dates from the 1960s. Probably, the
tries. It must be remembered here that
major explanations are related to the
Somalia had a territorial dispute with
area’s strategic value. First, two impor-
Ethiopia over the Ogaden and that the
tant international confrontations cut
USSR, at this time, had already culti-
across the Horn: the Arab-Israeli con-
vated a strong presence in Somalia.
flict, and the Sino-Soviet rivalry, whose
That presence was cemented with Gen.
geographic expression involved the
Mohammed Said Barre’s successful
whole area stretching from the Western
military coup in October 1969 after
Pacific, to Southeast and South Asia,
which he turned his country’s orienta-
and into the Indian Ocean littoral. Also,
tion sharply toward Moscow, signing a
the Horn’s strategic location along East-
Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and
West communication and transportation
Cooperation in 1974. Under the treaty,
routes enables it to serve as a critical
the Somali government was generously
vantage point to command or interdict
supplied with military aid and the So-
oil shipments from the Middle East and
viets acquired access to the strategic
elsewhere. Furthermore, in the post-
port of Berbera. With all this at stake,
colonial setting, newly liberated Afri-
Moscow had reason to be prudent in
can states had increasingly become tar-
assessing the PMAC’s reliability before
gets for Marxist-Leninist ideological
considering a new commitment.
expansion to alienate “Western imperi-
The PMAC, on the other hand, had
alist states.” As Soviet leader Leonid I.
two serious problems of its own which
Brezhnev had once remarked, “Africa
inhibited it from seeking an immediate
[had become] a main field of battle for
embrace from Moscow. One was that
communism.”1 Moreover, in one of the
initially it was unclear about its ideo-
documents published here, Cuba’s Fi-
logical preference and international ori-
del Castro reinforces this idea in an
entation. An illuminating account of
April 1977 meeting with his East Ger-
this confusion is provided by Major
man counterpart, Erich Honecker, by
Dawit Wolde Giorgis, a high ranking
stating that “in Africa we can inflict a
official of the military regime who later
severe defeat on the entire reactionary
defected to the United States and wrote
imperialist policy. We can free Africa
a book. In it he stated that the PMAC
from the influence of the USA and of
was so “ignorant in the realm of ideol-
the Chinese . . . Ethiopia has a great
ogy that at one point in the early stage
revolutionary potential . . . So there is a
of the revolution delegations were sent
great counterweight to [Egyptian Presi-
to Tanzania, Yugoslavia, China, and
dent Anwar] Sadat’s betrayal in Egypt
India to shop for one for Ethiopia.”2 It
. . . We must have an integrated strat-
is important to note that the Soviet
egy for the whole African continent.”
Union was apparently not even consid-
Thus, the Soviet Union along with its
ered as a possible source of ideological
40 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 41
inspiration by the military rulers at an
ation. With the help of the chief of the
Ethiopian leadership prior to the coup
early stage.
palace security force commander, he
which is implied between the lines of
The other problem was that the
essentially carried out a mafia-style
one of the discussions of the CPSU
Council engaged in three major succes-
coup by simply ambushing and execut-
Third African Department Report. This
sive rounds of bloody power struggles
ing the ringleaders of the restructuring
refers to a late-1976 Cuban and South
before Mengistu emerged as the uncon-
who were unsuspectingly preparing for
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