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of quoting from the Embassy’s note No. 348
of 24 October 1962. The Embassy has been
entrusted by its government hereby to bring
to the attention of the Ministry the opera-
tional portion of the Proclamation, issued
by the President of the United States of
America on 21 November 1962, on the lift-
ing of the quarantine announced on 23 Oc-
tober 1962.
“I, John F. Kennedy, President of the
United States of America, acting with the
authority given to me by the Constitution
and the laws of the United States, hereby
declare that at 23 hours 00 minutes Green-
wich time on 20 November 1962, I re-
scinded the powers given to the Defense
Department by Proclamation No. 3504 of
23 October 1962, and cancelled the orders
it contained to the armed forces under my
command.”
The Embassy of the United States of
America
Moscow, 10 December 1962
Translated by Ju. Sokolikov
[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK
(Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP,
and on file at National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C.; translation by John
Henriksen, Harvard University.]
EDITOR’S NOTES
1 Gromyko here evidently refers to Dorticos’
speech to the U.N. General Assembly of 8 Octo-
ber 1962. Dorticos stated: “Were the Untied States
able to give us proof, by word and deed, that it
would not carry out aggression against our coun-
try, then, we declare solemnly before you here
and now, our weapons would be unnecessary and
our army redundant.” New York Times, 9 Octo-
ber 1962.
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 337
A.I. Mikoyan invited Heller to visit the
Soviet Union.
Those present asked Mikoyan if, in his
opinion, Castro is interested in normalizing
relations and about Castro himself as the
ruler of Cuba.
A.I. Mikoyan in his statements about
his trip to Cuba underlined Cuba’s intrest in
having the chance to build a [word illeg-
ible] life in a peaceful setting, and the lack
of any serious signs of readiness on the part
of the USA to normalize [relations] with
Cuba.
Dobrynin and Bubnov transcribed the
conversation.
[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,
provided to CWIHP, and on file at National
Security Archive; translated by David Wolff,
CWIHP.]
Memorandum from the Head of the
USSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU,
7 December 1962
I am reporting on the removal of 42
IL-28 planes from Cuba.
1. The ship “Okhotsk,” carrying 12 IL-
28 airplanes, left the port at Nuevita on 4
December at 23:00 Moscow time.
After the departure of the “Okhotsk”
from the port, American planes began fly-
ing back and forth over the ship, taking pho-
tos. We recorded the identification numbers
of the planes.
On 6 December at 9:00, the USA war-
ship number 943 appeared near the stern of
the “Okhotsk,” and informed the captain of
our vessel that it would be following the
“Okhotsk” all night, and asked that the boxes
containing the IL-28 planes be opened for
photographing. The captain gave his con-
sent, and towards dawn on 7 December the
USA destroyer carried out an inspection of
the Soviet ship.
2. The “Kasimov” left the port of
Mariel at 14:45 on 5 December, carrying on
board 15 IL-28 planes.
The “Kasimov” was also subjected to
constant overhead flights by USA war
planes whose identification numbers we re-
corded.
A bomber of the “Neptune” class, with
the number 6-145922, asked us to open the
packing of our deck cargo for photograph-
ing. This request was fulfilled by the cap-
tain of the “Kasimov.” After this, the plane
2
Kennedy had asked Congress to approve the
call-up of 150,000 reservists on 7 September
1962.
3 Not further identified.
4 An obvious allusion to the failed attack on Cuba
in April 1961 at the Bay of Pigs by CIA-supported
anti-Castro Cuban exiles.
5 The date of this conversation is not specified in
the text, but Kennedy appears to be referring to
the meeting between Robert Kennedy and Soviet
Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin on the same
day as the 4 September 1962 statement to under-
line the President’s concerns about Soviet mili-
tary aid to Cuba.
6 The Russian text is unclear as to whether it re-
fers to a “bar-man” (barkeeper) or a last name
such as “Berman,” “Barman,” or “Burman.”
7 Possibly a reference to journalist Robert J.
Donovan.
8 It is noteworthy that the Soviet message strongly
implies that a U.S. invasion of Cuba would not
trigger a military response from the USSR, but
only political condemnation. This hinted at a
brewing disagreement between Moscow and Ha-
translation of which appears in an appendix to
Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 481-
482.
16 A reference to anti-U.S. protests held outside
the embassy in Moscow during the crisis.
17 Evidently a reference to the U.S. Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency, which Kennedy
created.
18 For English translations of the Russian records
of conversations in Havana between Mikoyan and
Castro and the Cuban leadership on 3-5 Novem-
ber 1962, see Vladislav Zubok, “`Dismayed by
the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks
with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, No-
vember 1962" (plus accompanying documents),
CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 59, 89-92 and
109, 159.
19 Until the missile crisis, Georgi Bolshakov, a
Soviet official based at the USSR Embassy in
Washington, had been used as a back-channel go-
beteen to deliver messages between Khrushchev
and the Kennedys, meeting frequently with Rob-
ert Kennedy. As the document indicates, this
channel ended after the Kennedys concluded that
Bolshakov had been used to mislead them by
transmitting false reassurances in the summer and
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