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word is satisfactory.
[* ]The argument in full would be thus: pleasure is good; but good is exercise of
faculty (?½Á³µ¹±), and this is a process or transition (³½µÃ¹Â); ? pleasure is a
transition. But according to Aristotle the highest ?½Á³µ¹± involves no transition or
motion at all (cf. 14, 8), and in every true ?½Á³µ¹±, even when a transition is involved,
the end is attained at every moment. Cf. Met. ix. 6. 1048b.
[* ]The argument is, Pleasure is good because it is the opposite of pain, which is
evil. No, says Speusippus; it is neither pleasure nor pain, but the neutral state,
which is opposite to both, that is good. No, replies Aristotle, for then pleasure
will be bad.
[* ]Virtuous faculties and activities (II. 6, 20) do not admit of excess, because by their
very nature they are right and occupy the mean; too much of them would be a
contradiction in terms.
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[* ]Pain generally (?»ÉÂ) is bad, to be avoided.
Objection: The pain of foregoing certain excessive pleasures is not to be avoided.
Answer: The opposite of these excessive pleasures, i.e. the foregoing them, is not
painful to the virtuous man, but only to him who sets his heart upon them, i.e. to a
vicious or incontinent man.
[ ]As these words disturb the order of the argument, I have, following Ramasauer,
put them in brackets; but I see no sufficient reason for regarding them as spurious.
[* ]Cf. supra, 12, 2.
I am sick and take medicine, hungry and take food (which seems to be here included
under medicine); but neither the drug nor the food can of themselves cure me and
restore the balance of my system they must be assimilated (for the body is not like a
jar that can be filled merely by pouring water from another jar), i. e. part of my system
must remain in its normal state and operate in its normal manner. But this operation,
this ?½Á³µ¹± Ä·? º±Ä? ?Íù½ ?¾µÉÂ, is pleasure (by the definition given above, 12, 3),
and in ignorance of the process we transfer the pleasure to the medicine and call it
pleasant. The weakness of this account is that it overlooks the fact that, though the
medicino cannot itself cure without the operation of Ä·? º±Ä? ?Íù½ ?¾µÉÂ, yet on the
other hand this ?¾¹Â, this faculty, cannot operate in this manner without this stimulus;
so that there seems to be no reason why the medicine, as setting up an ?½Á³µ¹± Ä·?Â
º±Ä? ?Íù½ ?¾µÉÂ, should not itself be called ?Íõ¹ ?´Í. But the whole passage rests on
the assumption that there can be activity without stimulus, i.e. without want an
assumption which has become inconceivable to us.
[* ]Cf. X. 7, 8.
[* ]ÄÉ?½ ´¹º±¯É½ Ä? ¼¬»¹Ãı, sc. Ä? ?À¹µ¹ºÂ: cf. V. 10, and VI. 11, 2.
[ ]Cf. Plato, Rep., 334.
[! ]Literally, Crow to crow.
[§ ]Literally, say that all who thus resemble one another are to one another like
potters, alluding to the saying of Hesiod,
š±? ºµÁ±¼µ? ºµÁ±¼µ?? º¿Äµ¹ º±? ĺĿ½¹ ĺÄɽ Potter quarrels with potter, and
carpenter with carpenter.
[* ]See Ramsauer.
[* ]A family of importance in a Greek state was usually connected by ties of
hospitality with other families in other states: persons so connected were not ?¯»¿¹, not
strictly friends, since they lived apart; but ¾½¿¹, for which there is no English
equivalent.
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[* ]To a Greek, of course, this does not necessarily imply living under the same roof,
as it does to us with our very different conditions of life.
[* ]Reading À¿»»¿?Â.
[* ]The words [Editor: illegible character]½ ¼? º±? Ä·?? ?ÁµÄ·?? ?ÀµÁǷı¹ literally
mean unless he also be surpassed in virtue. Who is he ? Not the former, for ?
ÃÀ¿Å´±??¿Â, the ideally good man, cannot be surpassed in virtue; therefore the
latter the great man, the tyrant, king or prince. The whole passage displays a decided
animus against princes (perhaps, as Stabr suggests, a reminiscence of experiences in
the Macedonian court).
[* ]The general rule of justice is that what different people receive is different, being
proportionate to their respective merits (Ä? º±Ä ?¾¯±½ ?ÿ½, or ?ÃÌĽ »Ì³É½: cf. V. 3,
6, 5, 6 and 17); in exceptional cases, when the merits of the persons are the same,
what they receive is equal (Ä? º±Ä ?¾¯±½ becomes Ä? º±Ä? À¿Ã?½ ?ÿ½). But
friendship in the primary sense is friendship between equals, so that the general rule
here is that both give and take equal amounts of love, etc.; in the exceptional case of
inequality between the persons, the amounts must be proportionate.
[* ]It is the institution of the state which gives a permanent significance to these
amusements of a day.
[* ]As the ?ÁÇ[Editor: illegible character]½ ²±Ã¹»µÍ at Athens.
[ ]Lit. more evident, sc. than that kingly rule is the best.
[* ]Scarcely consistent with 7, 4; but cf. 7, 1.
[* ]We pay taxes to the king, and tend our parents in their old age; but, as this is no
adequate repayment of what they have done for us, we owe them honour besides.
[* ]For he desires the good of his friend.
[* ]In the papers of October 8, 1880, a suit is reported in which A tries in vain to
recover from B certain goods given during courtship, according to B as presents,
according to A ?À? ?·Ä¿??Â, viz. on condition of marriage, which condition had not
been fulfilled.
[* ]Reading ? ?¼¿»Ì³·Ãµ½.
[* ]Where the two friends have different motives.
[* ]Viz. the pleasure of anticipation.
[* ]¼¹Ã¸? ´ ?½´Á? ?¯»? µ?Á·¼½¿Â ?Áº¹¿Â ?ÃÄÉ. Hesiod.
[* ]Omitting ?ºµ??½¿ Ä? ³µ½Ì¼µ½¿½, after Bywater, Journal of Philology, vol. xvii. p.
71.
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[* ]?±½?»¿Â here as elsewhere includes all who are not good, the incontinent as well
as the vicious.
[* ]Epicharmus was a Sicilian dramatist.
[* ]Reading ?½µÁ³µ¯? ´ ? À¿¹®Ã±Â Ä? ?Á³¿½ ?Ãį ÀÉÂ.
[* ]?³ºÁ±Ä®Â, continent, in whom the true masters the false self; ?ºÁ±Ä®Â, incontinent,
in whom the true self is mastered.
[* ]Reading ´?. See Stewart.
[ ](1) They are good, (2) they belong to him.
[* ]Cf. the last words of this book.
[* ]Cf. note on viii. 3, 4.
[* ]See a few lines on, end of § 5.
[* ]?ø»É?½ ¼µ?½ ³?Á ?À ?ø»? ¼±¸®Ãµ±¹. Theognis.
[* ]Ä? ±?ÁµÄ̽ covers, as no English word can, the transition from desired to
desirable.
[* ]The neutral state, neither pleasure nor pain, which they hold to be good.
[* ]Adopting Spengel s conjecture, ºµ½¿Í¼µ½¿Â for ĵ¼½Ì¼µ½¿Â.
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